The Art of Leading Out and Protection: How a Team Delivers Its Leader to the Attack Point, Seen Through the 2026 Milan-San Remo

When watching a broadcast, our eyes usually only follow the person attacking. But the outcome of a one-day Monument is often decided thirty minutes before the attack ever happens.

The Milan-San Remo on March 21, 2026, happened to leave behind a very complete, very suitable record to use as a teaching example. This article uses the already-publicized sequence of events from that race to break down step by step: how a team gets its leader to the point of attack.

What Actually Happened That Day

Let’s first lay out the documented timeline, without adding any speculation:

Look at that “half a wheel” at the end, then look back at that “escort back to the peloton” in the second row—the cause and effect between those two things is the entire theme of this article.

Phase One: The Rescue

The crash happened with 32.5 km remaining, one of the worst possible positions on the course. Milan-San Remo is a race of nearly 300 km, and all the long buildup beforehand exists solely for this final sequence of climbs from the Cipressa to the Poggio; at this moment the peloton is accelerating and lining out, making it one of the fastest sections of the entire day.

Chasing back to such a peloton alone carries an enormous cost—because you have to ride faster than the group, fully exposed to the wind. Two or three teammates taking turns on the front is what brings that cost down to a level the leader can absorb.

The technical key here is “rotation rhythm,” not “raw power”:

• The rider on the front must maintain a steady speed, not surging and slowing, or the rider being escorted will have to constantly accelerate and decelerate, which is actually more tiring.
• The changes at the front should be short and frequent. Long solo pulls degrade the quality of the rotation.
• The leader has only one job: stay in the most sheltered position and do nothing.

The value of Vermeersch and Großschartner’s stretch wasn’t how fast they rode, but that they got Pogačar back to the peloton with the energy for the attack still in his legs.

Phase Two: The Lead-Out

Getting back to the peloton only means returning to the starting point. Next, McNulty and Del Toro took over on the front—this stretch does something entirely different.

The lead-out has three purposes, usually happening simultaneously:

1. Controlling the pace to compress the peloton

When one team keeps driving the pace at the front, the peloton stretches into a long line. Once riders are strung out single-file, the cost of changing position skyrockets—other teams trying to move their leaders forward must burn extra watts to come around from the side.

2. Securing the leader’s position

The effectiveness of an attack depends heavily on what position you’re in at the moment you launch. Attacking from the middle of the peloton means you have to thread through a dozen riders before you’re actually clear; attacking from the top three, you’re free from the very first second. Teammates leading at the front are effectively carving a corridor through the wall of riders for the leader.

3. Burning off potential followers

The high pace itself is a form of selection. By the time the attack actually happens, a batch of riders who could have responded is already gone.

After Pogačar attacked that day, only van der Poel and Pidcock could follow. That result of “only two riders” was a direct product of the earlier lead-out phase.

Phase Three: The Moment of the Handoff

There is a very fine transition point between the lead-out and the attack. Let go too early, and the leader has to absorb extra wind resistance on his own; let go too late, and the leader gets boxed in behind his teammates and misses the section.

The point Pogačar chose was 2.5 km before the Cipressa summit—a spot where the gradient is still there but the top is near. This is a sound choice as a general rule: attacking on a climb means lower speeds, a smaller penalty from wind resistance, and less benefit for followers, giving the attacker the greatest relative advantage. (This is a general principle of aerodynamics, not an internal explanation of that specific race.)

Why “Half a Wheel” Is Worth Remembering

In the end, Pogačar didn’t ride solo into the finish. He launched his sprint with 200 meters to go on Via Roma and beat Pidcock by half a wheel.

Half a wheel—converted, that’s a gap of a few tenths of a second.

That means: if after that crash at 32.5 km to go, two teammates hadn’t brought him back to the peloton, or the process of getting back had cost a few extra dozen watts; if McNulty and Del Toro’s lead-out hadn’t put him in the right position—this victory would not exist.

A 300 km race, ultimately decided by half a wheel; and that half a wheel was saved for him by his teammates dozens of kilometers earlier.

Three Drills to Bring Back to Taiwan

To practice this system on a weekend group ride, you don’t need the scale of a professional team:

1. Practice “steady pulls” instead of “going fast.” Find a flat stretch on the Beiyi Highway or along the coast, take turns on the front with two riders, and the goal is for the rider behind to never touch the brakes and never need to sprint out of the saddle.
2. Practice “delivering someone to the base of the climb.” Agree on a climb (Fengguizui, Yangjin P-route, or any of them will do), and for the 5 km before the climb, teammates are responsible for leading the group to the base; only on the climb itself does everyone ride for themselves. You’ll feel very clearly the difference in your legs between “having someone lead you” and “riding there yourself.”
3. Practice “dropped-rider recovery.” When someone falls off the back, assign two riders to go back and collect them, rather than the whole group waiting or the whole group pressing on. This is the most practical drill—and the one the fewest people practice.

The lead-out and the escort never appear on the results sheet, but they determine which name appears on it.

(The race sequence in this article is taken from public records; the tactical and aerodynamic explanations are general principles, not the internal decision-making content of that specific race.)

Related Reading

• From a Crash Landing to Half a Wheel: Full Analysis of Pogačar’s First Career Win at the 2026 Milan-San Remo
• After the Crash: On Mental Resilience and Physical Recovery Rhythm in Sports, from the 2026 San Remo
• All for One: How UAE Team Emirates XRG Is Built Around Pogačar—A Case Study from the 2026 Season
• The Arithmetic of the Poggio at Milan-San Remo: After 290 km, Those 5 Minutes Decide Everything