2026 Tour de France S8 Live Report: Périgueux→Bergerac—Merrill Wins Two Days in a Row, Slock Holds Out Until 1.5 km to Go

1. Stage Basics: A Day in the Dordogne Valley — Officially “Flat,” but Riders Know Better

On July 11, 2026, the Tour de France reaches Stage 8, starting from Périgueux, the capital of the Dordogne department, heading southwest into the Dordogne Valley, and finishing in Bergerac, a town renowned for its wine. The official spec lists 180.4 km with 1,150 m of climbing; the CTYeh database records 182.2 km with 1,209 m of climbing. The gap between the two figures is small and usually stems from differences in measurement baselines (GPS track sampling density, whether neutralized start/finish sections are included). Both are listed here so riders who plan routes using the database can match them up.

More important than the distance is the controversy over the stage classification. ASO officially categorizes this stage as Flat — theoretically a day reserved for sprinters. But the CTYeh database labels it HILLY. Neither is wrong; it’s a difference in classification logic: the official view asks “will this stage end in a bunch sprint?” while the database asks “what is the actual terrain texture of this route?” By outcome, the official call was right — it did end in a bunch sprint. But by feel on the bike, the database label is more honest — 1,150 m of climbing packed into 180 km, including two Category 4 climbs, is not a route you can cruise along. Taiwanese riders should relate to this discrepancy: in Taiwan, many routes that “look flat on the map” end up with over 1,000 m of accumulated climbing, simply because the road rolls up and down in 30-to-50-meter undulations the whole way.

Périgueux: A City Defined by Romans and Truffles

The start town, Périgueux, is the administrative center of the Dordogne department, situated on the Isle River. The city’s role in European history is ancient — in Roman times it was called Vesunna, and traces of an amphitheater and temple ruins remain to this day. After the Middle Ages, the old town became defined by limestone houses and the Byzantine-domed Cathédrale Saint-Front as its landmark. For the culinary world, Périgueux is synonymous with “black truffle” and “foie gras,” and the sauce Périgueux in French cuisine is a truffle sauce named after this very place.

For the Tour de France, Périgueux is no stranger. It’s the kind of mid-sized city ASO uses as a start or finish every few years: good transport links, enough space downtown for team buses and the media center, and a surrounding road network that can produce routes of every difficulty. Starting from Périgueux turns the entire Dordogne Valley into a natural showcase corridor.

From Plateaus, River Valleys to Cliffside Villages: Domme and Buisson-de-Cadouin

The first half of the stage winds through the hilly terrain south of Périgueux, then cuts toward the Dordogne River. The scenery along this stretch is among the most iconic images in French tourism campaigns: river bends, white limestone cliffs, medieval castles perched on the cliffs, and bastides (planned medieval fortified villages). Domme is one of the most representative — built atop a rock face on the north bank of the Dordogne, listed among the “Most Beautiful Villages of France,” with a viewpoint at the village entrance overlooking the entire valley. The Tour routing the race up to Domme carries far more tourism value than competitive value, but for the riders, it means climbing a slope and then threading through the village’s narrow streets.

Buisson-de-Cadouin, closer in the direction of Bergerac, is another small town along the Dordogne, near Cadouin, famous for its Cistercian abbey. The terrain here is typical of “plateaus cut open by river valleys” — the roads aren’t steep, but whenever you leave the riverbank, you climb up to the plateau edge, then drop back down to the river. The damage from this terrain isn’t in any single climb — it’s in the repetition.

Bergerac: Wine, Cyrano, and a Slightly Uphill Straight

The finish town, Bergerac, sits on the Dordogne River and is one of southwestern France’s major wine regions. Bergerac AOC covers red, white, and rosé wines, with the nearby Monbazillac appellation famous for its botrytized sweet white wines. The city has another layer of cultural fame — although the actual connection between Edmond Rostand’s Cyrano de Bergerac protagonist and this city is a matter of literary-historical debate, a statue of Cyrano does stand in Bergerac’s center, a must-photo for tourists.

What truly matters for this race is the road surface before the finish: the official data explicitly notes that the finishing straight rises slightly towards the line. That sentence looks unremarkable, but it’s one of the keys to understanding the sprint result — as we’ll see later, Tim MERLIER was clearly fading in the final 50 meters yet still held on for the win, and this slight uphill is the backdrop. It punishes both “launching too early” and “pure explosive sprinters lacking a finishing kick.”

Time and Weather

Taiwan viewing time starts at 19:00; the neutral start is 13:15 (local French time), with the official estimated arrival at 17:20. As for weather, the day is hot — both official and race reports describe high temperatures, adding extra burden to the chase rhythm in the latter half, the escapees’ hydration management, and the sprint trains’ high output in the final 30 km.

Stack all this context together and the stage’s character becomes clear: it’s a long stage that “looks flat but grinds you down.” Nearly 180 km, constant undulation, narrow roads, hot weather, and two Category 4 climbs that count for points. For sprint teams, the biggest fear on this kind of stage isn’t the breakaway going too fast — it’s their own train getting picked apart bit by bit by terrain and narrow roads in the final 40 km. And that’s exactly what happened.

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2. Pre-Race Situation: A Tightly Calculated Ledger

To understand why Stage 8 played out the way it did, you have to lay out the first week’s books.

The Sprinters’ Scorecard

Going into Stage 8, this Tour had offered relatively few true “pure sprint opportunities.” Here’s how the earlier stages broke down:

• Stage 4 Carcassonne → Foix: won by Mads PEDERSEN (LIDL-TREK) — the kind of “not a pure sprint, but a hard finish” that happens to be Pedersen’s home turf.
• Stage 5 Lannemezan → Pau: Olav KOOIJ (DECATHLON CMA CGM) took the win, his first Grand Tour stage victory. That stage had a late crash that split the front group, which also affected the final standings.
• Stage 6 Pau → Gavarnie-Gèdre: a mountain stage over the Tourmalet, where Tadej POGACAR won dominantly and took the yellow jersey. That same day, he surpassed André Darrigade’s record of 22 Tour de France stage wins — and Darrigade was a legendary sprinter from the Landes region, making the handover highly symbolic.
• Stage 7 finishing in Bordeaux: Tim MERLIER (SOUDAL QUICK-STEP) took it — a textbook clean lead-out.

Crunching the numbers, before Stage 8 this Tour had roughly three true bunch sprints, and the ledger reads: Merlier 1 win, Kooij 1 win, Jasper PHILIPSEN (ALPECIN-PREMIER TECH) zero. Philipsen finished 5th in both Pau and Bordeaux — the kind of “always there, but always just short” result that is mentally torturous for a sprinter.

Green Jersey: From Solo Lead to a Two-Way Fight

The green jersey standings after Stage 7 look like this:

Rank	Rider	Points
1	PEDERSEN	204
2	GIRMAY	145
3	KANTER	140
4	MERLIER	134
5	PHILIPSEN	126
6	POGACAR	75
7	WÆRENSKJOLD	73
8	KOOIJ	70
9	TURGIS	64
10	VINGEGAARD	61

Pedersen has 204 points, leading second place by 59 points. This number is subtle: 59 points is roughly the haul from winning a stage finale sprint (50 points) plus one intermediate sprint. In other words, Pedersen’s lead looks comfortable, but if someone sweeps both the intermediate and final sprints in a single day while Pedersen happens to score nothing in that stage, the lead gets slashed by more than half. This also explains why Pedersen can’t simply be a spectator on flat stages like this—he must contest the intermediate sprints and also fight to get into the points zone at the finish.

The GC Group: The Top Strategic Goal of the Day Is “Don’t Crash”

On the general classification front, the situation after Stage 7 is:

• 1. POGACAR 24h56’17"
• 2. Jonas VINGEGAARD +2’42"
• 3. Isaac DEL TORO +3’27"
• 4. Remco EVENEPOEL +3’30"
• 5. Juan AYUSO +3’34"
• 6. SEIXAS +3’55"
• 7. LIPOWITZ +4’00"
• 8. L. MARTINEZ +4’21"
• 9. SKJELMOSE +4’57"
• 10. VACEK +7’10"

Several things can be read from this table. First, the gap Pogacar opened at Tourmalet (2’42" over Vingegaard) is already a substantial lead, but not yet to the point of “race over.” Second, riders ranked 3rd through 5th are bunched within 7 seconds (3’27" / 3’30" / 3’34"), meaning any echelon split or late-race crash could reshuffle the order. Third, for all GC riders, the expected value of this stage is negative—there’s little to gain, but one crash could cost the entire three weeks.

Team Visma | Lease a Bike’s situation deserves special mention. They were affected by the late-race crash chaos on Stage 5, lost time on Tourmalet on Stage 6, and their internal logic for Stage 8 is unquestionably: save energy, hold position, don’t crash. Red Bull - BORA - HANSGROHE likewise has no reason to complicate things, although the internal team order dynamics between Evenepoel and LIPOWITZ remain a media talking point.

Another footnote from the first week: before Stage 6, the yellow jersey was worn by Norway’s TRÆEN (UNO-X MOBILITY), who crashed while defending the jersey and did not start Stage 7 (DNS). The number of starters on Stage 7 was 176. This also reminds us that, up to Stage 8, the first week of this Tour de France has hardly been calm.

Lotto Intermarché’s Business Calculation

There’s one more team whose motivation must be explained first, or else the script of the first 170 kilometers of this stage won’t make sense: LOTTO INTERMARCHE. They lost Arnaud DE LIE earlier in the season, effectively losing their strongest card for winning on flat stages. For a team that needs exposure, only one option remains—long-range attacks. The most aggressive rider award on Stage 7 went to Baptiste VEISTROFFER, and on Stage 8 to Liam SLOCK. Two days in a row, the same team sending riders out—this isn’t a coincidence, it’s strategy.

III. Route Technical Analysis: Two Category 4 Climbs, a Narrow Street, and the Final Slight Uphill

Côte de Domme: 3.7 km / 3.3% average, summit at km 102.6

First, the numbers: 3.7 km, 3.3% average gradient, with the summit at km 102.6, roughly 57% into the stage. By Tour de France standards, this is a Category 4 climb, with only 1 point for the winner—virtually no impact on the polka dot jersey.

But the 3.3% figure is easily underestimated. A gradient around 3% is the range where “the peloton’s speed doesn’t drop much, but the power demand rises significantly.” A peloton cruising at 45 km/h on the flat, hitting a 3.3% climb and trying to maintain above 35 km/h, requires riders to output power not much easier than pushing 50 km/h on the flat; the difference is that on the flat, high speed offers the shelter of the peloton’s draft, while on a climb the proportion of air resistance drops, and the benefit of drafting drops with it, which hurts the riders at the back of the bunch most. In other words, the real function of a Category 4 climb isn’t to “filter out climbing ability,” but to stretch the peloton out and make the riders at the back start paying an extra price.

Domme also has a variable beyond the terrain: narrow village streets. The official description explicitly mentions that the peloton gets squeezed (pinch point) while passing through Domme due to narrow streets, causing a brief slowdown. This kind of pinch point affects the race on three levels:

1. Positioning battle moves earlier—teams wanting to hold position on or after the climb will start fighting for the front 2 to 3 km before entering the narrow streets, effectively fighting an extra battle with no reward.
2. Accordion effect—the front slows, the back is forced to brake, then has to accelerate to catch back up. Repeated several times, the riders at the back burn far more energy than those at the front.
3. Increased crash risk—narrow streets combined with curbs, street furniture, and spectator barriers are a classic high-risk section.

Côte du Buisson-de-Cadouin: summit at km 140.4, 40 km from the finish

The official race notes don’t give the full length and average gradient for this second Category 4 climb like they did for Domme, but its position matters more than its difficulty: the summit sits 40 kilometers from the finish.

This is a classic “tactical sweet spot.” Being 40 km from the finish means:

• For sprint teams: too early to start the final lead-out train, yet already too late to let the situation spiral out of control.
• For teams looking to disrupt: just right. Attack from here, and if a front group of 10 to 20 riders can be split off, the remaining 40 km is enough to make the chase behind extremely painful; even if they get caught, the sprint teams’ rhythm has already been disrupted.
• For the breakaway: this is the mirror that reveals “who really still has legs.” The three riders sharing the pace work, once cracked on the climb, can never get back together.

In fact, as we’ll see later, this is exactly the only true turning point of this stage—EF Education-EasyPost launched here, with Kasper ASGREEN accelerating on the climb and splitting off a gap of about 10 riders.

The Slight Uphill Before the Finish: An Invisible Judge

Returning to that official description: the finishing straight rises gently.

In the physics of sprinting, the road gradient over the final 200 meters is a severely underestimated variable. Here is a reasoned analysis (not official data): a slight uphill of around 1% means that, for a sprint exceeding 60 km/h, the power required to “maintain speed” increases significantly, and the penalty accumulates over time. A pure explosive sprinter can sustain a flat road with a maximal effort for 8 to 10 seconds; with a slight uphill, the same power curve will show a noticeable speed decay in the final 3 to 4 seconds.

This explains two key phenomena of this stage:

1. Merril visibly slowed in the final 50 meters yet still held on for the win—because everyone was slowing down; the difference lay only in who slowed less and whose timing of launch was right.
2. Those who launched too early were punished especially hard—this was previewed during the intermediate sprint when Slock lost to Jakub OTRUBA.

Overall Pace Design

Putting these three elements together, the pace design of this route is quite interesting:

Section	Distance	Character	Effect on the Race
Start to km 58	0–58 km	Rolling, narrow roads	Breakaway forms, gap reaches its daily maximum
km 58–102	58–102 km	Valley cruising	Sprint teams control pace, gap begins to shrink
Côte de Domme	km 102.6 summit	Category 4 climb + narrow streets	Climbing points, pinch point, positioning battle
Intermediate sprint after Domme	approx. from km 105	Flat	First battleground for green jersey points
Côte du Buisson-de-Cadouin	km 140.4 summit	Category 4 climb	The real attack point, breakaway fractures
Final 40 km	140–180 km	Rolling, slight uphill finish	Catch calculation and train reassembly

This is a route that crams all the drama into the final 78 kilometers. The first 100 kilometers are the setup, Domme is the first breath, Buisson-de-Cadouin is the fuse, and the final 40 kilometers are the detonation.

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4. Race Report (Part 1): An Opening Battle Even Fiercer Than the Day Before

Asgreen Marked Out of It: Treatment of “Identity as Guilt”

The race was more intense from the gun than the day before. The first to try and get away was Kasper ASGREEN—and he was immediately marked out of it.

This moment deserves a closer look, because it reveals the core logic of modern Tour de France breakaway battles: the composition of a breakaway is not decided by who wants to go, but by whom the peloton allows to go. Asgreen is the kind of rider who keeps sprint teams awake at night on flat stages: he has time-trial-level cruising ability, a classics endurance base, and a track record of solo wins. If he got into the break, the breakaway’s cruising speed would jump up a notch, and the plan of “just control the pace today” would immediately fall apart.

The official race report clearly states that NSN CYCLING TEAM was especially vigilant. That makes sense—Biniam GIRMAY was their only card for this stage, and the scenario they could least accept was the peloton exhausting itself and still failing to catch the break. So every time Asgreen moved, someone followed; they followed until he couldn’t get away.

Otruba Makes the First Attack After the Flag Drop, Guernalec Follows

According to the official record, the first rider to attack after the flag drop (end of the neutral zone, official start) was Jakub OTRUBA (CAJA RURAL-SEGUROS RGA), with Thibault GUERNALEC (TOTALENERGIES) following.

The pairing itself was a signal. Caja Rural-Seguros RGA is one of this Tour’s wildcard teams; for a team of this level, the value of three weeks at the Tour lies not in results but in camera time—sponsors want to see the jersey on the live broadcast. TotalEnergies is likewise a French domestic team, and getting into a breakaway on home soil in a French stage doubles the value.

But this first wave of attacks didn’t succeed. The reason is simple: the rhythm of successive attacks and counters was too fast, and the peloton hadn’t yet decided who to let go today. For an early break to stick, two conditions must be met simultaneously—the attackers pose no threat, and the pace-controlling teams in the peloton have reached an unspoken agreement. At the first wave, neither condition was in place, so they were brought back.

km 3: Slock Strikes

What truly lit the fuse was Liam SLOCK (LOTTO INTERMARCHE) at km 3.

As mentioned earlier, Lotto Intermarché’s situation: after losing De Lie, they have no winning card on flat stages, leaving only exposure to fight for. Van Gils took the most aggressive rider prize on Stage 7; on Stage 8, it was Slock’s turn. This pattern of daily long-range attacks is a well-established commercial operation in the professional peloton—sponsors don’t want win rates; they want “someone on camera every day”.

Slock’s timing was also clever. km 3, right after that high-intensity exchange involving Asgreen—the peloton’s attention had just shifted away from a “dangerous” rider, and tension naturally dropped; at that moment, a rider with no GC threat and not a top sprinter slipping away faced the loosest psychological defense from the peloton.

km 6: Three-Man Group Forms

At km 6, Otruba and Guernalec accelerated again to join Slock, and the three-man breakaway was officially formed.

Three riders is a very typical breakaway size. Analytically, this number has its logic: too few (one or two) can’t sustain the pace-lining for 170 kilometers; too many (eight or more) makes the peloton feel threatened and chase harder. Three sits right at the boundary between “acceptable to the peloton” and “barely able to maintain cooperation”.

And the composition of these three determined the ceiling of the day’s script:

• Slock: Lotto Intermarché, targeting the most aggressive rider prize and all-day exposure, with the strongest motivation.
• Otruba: Caja Rural, a wildcard team, targeting camera time plus any points available.
• Guernalec: TotalEnergies, standard operating procedure for a French team on a French stage.

None of the three posed a GC threat, and none were top sprinters capable of rewriting the green jersey standings. The peloton’s judgment was: let them go, then reel them in slowly over the course of the day. That judgment proved correct in the end, but “reeling them in slowly” turned out to be far harder than expected on this day.

5. Race Report (Part 2): Pace Control, Domme, and the First Points Battle

The Gap Curve: A Precisely Managed Line

After the three-man break formed, the gap began to climb: first to 1’50", then past 2 minutes, with the day’s maximum at km 58, reaching 2’15". After that, the line never turned back:

Time Point	Gap
km 58 (daily maximum)	2’15"
130 km to go	2’10"
100 km to go	1’30"

Looking at these three points, you can read the quality of the peloton’s pace control. From km 58 to “130 km to go” (a stretch after roughly km 50), the gap only dropped 5 seconds—this was the maintenance phase, where the peloton simply kept the gap from growing without truly chasing. Then, by “100 km to go,” the gap dropped 40 seconds in one go—this was the start of the compression phase.

With a ceiling of 2’15", the breakaway was never given a real chance all day. On a modern Tour de France flat stage, a breakaway typically needs a buffer of over 4 minutes to succeed, along with sufficient numbers and quality. For three riders, 2 minutes 15 seconds was only enough to secure a full day of camera time and summit points—not enough to reach the finish—unless something went wrong in the peloton.

Soudal and Alpecin Share the Work, NSN Counts the Money

The official race report clearly states: SOUDAL QUICK-STEP and ALPECIN-PREMIER TECH took over the pace-setting early on, with Soudal doing the most work.

These are two teams whose results the day before were polar opposites, yet they did the same thing—which is interesting:

• Soudal Quick-Step (the Wolfpack) had just won the day before in Bordeaux thanks to Merlier. Logically, the winning side could afford to ease off slightly and let others chase. But they chose to keep pulling—analytically, this reflects a form of confidence: since Merlier proved yesterday he’s the fastest man in this group, bringing the race to a bunch sprint is the highest-probability path to victory, and the cost of pace-setting is a worthwhile investment.
• Alpecin-Premier Tech’s motivation is more direct: Philipsen hasn’t opened his account yet. They must ensure this stage ends in a bunch sprint, or another opportunity slips away. They also have the most expensive lead-out man in the world—Mathieu VAN DER POEL—an asset that can only be cashed in when the finish is a bunch sprint.

Meanwhile, NSN CYCLING TEAM is happy to save energy. The official race report makes it clear: their internal logic is that since Soudal and Alpecin are willing to hold the breakaway, Girmay’s team will conserve their strength.

That judgment turned out to be very smart. Girmay ultimately took 2nd place—in a sprint where “all lead-out trains were dismantled and it came down to individual ability,” the value of preserved energy far outweighs the number of teammates. You can think of it this way: when you expect the final 3 kilometers to become a chaotic melee, investing resources in “the leader’s legs” rather than “teammates’ wheels” yields a higher expected value.

Côte de Domme: The First Internal Ranking of the Three

At the summit of Côte de Domme (km 102.6), the three breakaway riders crossed in order:

• Sloock 1st (taking the KOM points)
• Otruba 2nd
• Géné 3rd

This order already reveals the trio’s priorities. Sloock is the most aggressive and ambitious—he wants not just camera time, but tangible rewards (KOM points, most aggressive rider award). And the fight for KOM points is itself an energy expenditure: sprinting for 1 point on a 3.7 km climb comes at a non-zero cost.

At the same time, the peloton was dealing with Domme’s narrow streets. The official description notes the bunch was squeezed by the tight roads and briefly slowed. For sprint teams, this is a section where positioning must be secured early; for GC teams, it’s where the leader must be protected inside the top 20. Heat, narrow streets, and a sprint point right after the climb—this is the first truly draining stretch of the stage.

Intermediate Sprint: Two Sprints, Two Lessons

Right after Domme comes the intermediate sprint point. Two things happened there, each with its own significance.

First: The intermediate sprint within the breakaway

Otruba beat Sloock—the race report attributes this to Sloock launching too early.

This is the first lesson in “timing of the jump” on this stage. The three-man sprint in the breakaway may look minor, but it’s a preview of the finish sprint later that day: on this route, those who go early get punished. Sloock had just sprinted for points on the climb a few kilometers earlier, and now he opened up again—and early at that. With few matches left in his legs, being overtaken by Otruba was no surprise.

Second: The intermediate sprint within the peloton

The order as the bunch crossed the intermediate sprint point:

Position (within peloton)	Rider
1	PHILIPSEN
2	KANTER
3	PEDERSEN
4	MERLIER
5	GIRMAY

The race report describes Philipsen as surging from the back to take the best of the bunch. This is worth noting: Philipsen wouldn’t win by the end of the day, but at the intermediate sprint he showed the best acceleration in the group at that moment—the problem was never his legs, but his position and timing of the launch.

Notably, four of these five riders are in the top five of the green jersey standings (PEDERSEN, KANTER, MERLIER, PHILIPSEN, GIRMAY are all there)—this proves the green jersey battle had entered full contact by this day. No one dared to give up the intermediate sprint points. The official record states that after this round, the order at the top of the points standings didn’t change—but that was temporary; the 50 points at the finish were the real leverage.

From a race management perspective, this intermediate sprint point had a side effect: it pushed the peloton’s speed up again right after the climb. For riders who had already covered 100 km in the heat, the sequence of “KOM climb → narrow streets → intermediate sprint” was the first stretch where fatigue truly accumulated on this stage.

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VI. Race Action (Part 3): Buisson-de-Cadouin, a Category 4 Climb That Split Two Groups

The Breakaway Cracks First

km 140.4, summit of Côte du Buisson-de-Cadouin, 40 km from the finish.

The breakaway splits here. Sloock and Otruba dropped Géné, then Sloock took another point, sweeping both KOM climbs of the day. Immediately after, Sloock went solo over the summit, with the peloton 1’40" behind.

This sequence of moves can be broken down into several layers of meaning:

1. Sloock sweeping both KOM points: This is a textbook “paving the way for the most aggressive rider award.” The Tour’s combativity award has no explicit formula, but the jury looks at number of attacks, time off the front, points-scoring efforts, and drama. Riding all day, taking both summit points, and going solo at the end—that’s a flawless résumé. He did indeed take the stage’s most aggressive rider award.
2. Dropping Géné: Three became two, then one. A breakaway never disintegrates all at once; it peels away like an onion, layer by layer.
3. Going solo over the summit: This is Sloock’s most crucial and most debatable decision of the day. From pure rational calculation, 1’40" over 40 km solo is nearly impossible—one man against the entire peloton, with several sprint teams behind looking to close it down. But from the perspective of exposure and awards, the choice was right: he guaranteed himself as the sole protagonist of the live broadcast for the next hour.

The Peloton Splits Simultaneously: EF and Asgreen’s Second Move

What truly made this category 4 climb the turning point of the stage was the simultaneous attack within the peloton.

The official race report records: EF Education-EasyPost attacked here; Asgreen, who had been blocked earlier, accelerated on the climb and tore open a gap of about 10 riders; then others bridged, swelling the front group. On the same climb, Jonas ABRAHAMSEN also attempted an attack at the summit.

This is a classic “second-motive” scenario. Asgreen was marked at the start and his escape failed—but his goal never changed. When the race has already covered 140 km, everyone is hot, everyone is tired, and the sprint teams have been pace-setting for 80 km, the same attack has a far higher success rate at this point than at the start. This is why pro riders say “attacks aren’t won with legs, but with timing.”

EF Education-EasyPost’s logic is equally clear: they have no top-tier sprinter on this stage, so their best expected value is to make the race messy. As long as the lead-out trains are dismantled, any rider in the front group has a chance to pick up a result; even if it fails, it burns the opponents.

Abrahamsen’s attack at the summit is a different calculation—he’s the type who excels at long-range escapes and solo efforts. Accelerating over the top was an attempt to latch onto the front group or even bridge to Sloock.

Stitched Up, But the Price Was Paid

The outcome: the gap was ultimately closed. The peloton brought the front group back on the descent and the subsequent roads.

But the official race report also recorded a crucial line: this disrupted the rhythm of the sprint teams and destroyed the cooperation of the breakaway.

The second point is particularly important. After this climb, the front became a fragmented formation: within 30 km of the finish, SLOCK was alone at the front, OTRUBA was chasing in the middle, and GNAINLEK was further back.

Three riders who could have shared the wind resistance by rotating became three individuals fighting the air alone. Physically, this almost sealed the breakaway’s fate—the efficiency gap between a three-man rotation and a solo ride is enormous at speeds above 40 km/h. Conversely, this also meant the peloton’s chase became less urgent: ahead was no longer a cooperative breakaway, but three gradually disintegrating points. The peloton only needed to maintain its pace to naturally reel them in.

This created the peculiar situation of the final 40 kilometers of the stage: SLOCK’s solo effort was doomed to fail, but the peloton itself was in disarray. Whoever sorted themselves out first would win.

VII. Race Report (Part 4): The Calculus of the Final 20 km Chase

This section is the most worthy of frame-by-frame analysis in the entire stage. The official race report left a very complete time gap curve. Arranging it into a table is like getting a textbook on “how a peloton precisely devours a solo rider.”

Time Gap Table

Distance to Finish	SLOCK’s Lead	Avg. Time Lost per km in Segment	What Happened on the Road
40 km (Buisson summit)	1’40"	—	Breakaway splits, SLOCK goes solo
20 km	1’20"	~1.0 sec	Peloton not yet at full effort, still reorganizing
10 km	1’05"	~1.5 sec	XDS Astana, Tudor, Cofidis move up; Decathlon, NSN, Uno-X join
8 km	50"	~7.5 sec	Lotto Intermarché tries to slow the peloton at a corner
6 km	35"	~7.5 sec	Chase fully engaged
4 km	25"	~5.0 sec	XDS Astana and Picnic PostNL form long trains
2.5 km	10"	~10.0 sec	Peloton speed peaks
1.5 km	Caught	—	Official: caught at 1.5 km (ProCyclingUK writes “just before the final kilometer”)

Segment-by-Segment Analysis

40 → 20 km: False Calm

From 1’40" at the summit to 1’20" with 20 km remaining, only 20 seconds were gained over 20 kilometers, averaging 1 second per kilometer. In terms of chase efficiency, this number is very low—the peloton wasn’t really chasing during this stretch.

Why? Analysis suggests two reasons. First, the gap created at Buisson-de-Cadouin had just been closed, and the peloton was reorganizing, with teammates still moving up to find their leaders. Second, sprint teams have their own timetable: the ideal point to close the gap is within the final 1 to 3 kilometers. Catching the break too early gives others space to counter-attack in the last 10 kilometers. A 1’20" lead with 20 km to go feels “comfortable and controllable” in a professional rider’s instinct.

20 → 10 km: Multiple Teams Step Up

This segment saw 1.5 seconds eaten per kilometer, still moderate. But the list of participants changed—the official report notes that with 10 km remaining, XDS ASTANA (for Max KANTER), TUDOR (for Rick PLUIMERS), COFIDIS (for Milan FRETIN) moved to the front, with DECATHLON CMA CGM (for COQUARD), NSN (for GIRMAY), and UNO-X MOBILITY (for Soren WÆRENSKJOLD) also joining the chase.

This list is highly informative. Note who is not on it: Soudal Quick-Step and Alpecin-Premier Tech. These two teams, which had controlled the pace all day, dropped back in the final 10 kilometers—not because they were exhausted, but because their phase of work had changed. The first 100 kilometers were about “preventing the breakaway from escaping”; the final 10 kilometers are about “positioning the leader correctly.” These are two completely different tasks. The reason Astana, Tudor, and Cofidis needed to come forward at this point is that their leaders aren’t strong enough to find their own position in the chaos—they must rely on their team to raise the speed and reduce the disorder.

In other words: in the final 10 kilometers, strong teams buy position; weaker teams buy order.

10 → 8 km: Cliff-Like Compression

This is the sharpest turning point on the entire curve: 15 seconds eaten in two kilometers, 7.5 seconds per kilometer—five times the rate of the previous segment.

At the same time, the official report recorded a theatrical detail: Lotto Intermarché tried to slow the peloton at a corner to buy time for SLOCK.

This tactic—a teammate dropping back to the front of the peloton to deliberately slow it down to protect a breakaway rider—is not uncommon in professional cycling, but its success rate is very low. With more than six teams simultaneously trying to increase the pace in the final 10 kilometers, it’s nearly impossible for one team to hold back the entire peloton. Judging by the result, this corner interference did not change the slope of the curve: the 8-to-6 km segment still saw 7.5 seconds lost per kilometer.

However, from a commercial standpoint, the action itself held value. It gave the broadcast cameras a few more seconds of Lotto Intermarché airtime and showed viewers “this team is fighting to the end for its teammate.”

8 → 4 km: Order Established

The compression rate slowed slightly in this segment (6→4 km at 5 seconds per kilometer), but the key is this line from the official report: with 4 km to go, XDS Astana and Team Picnic PostNL formed long trains at the front.

The significance of a long train is that the peloton transitions from “a chaotic multi-team chase” to “structured high speed.” When there’s a stable train at the front, speed is maintained at a very high level, but acceleration decreases—which is why the compression rate dropped from 7.5 sec/km to 5 sec/km. A train isn’t necessarily more efficient at catching riders than a chaotic chase, but it allows the leaders behind to save energy and predict what’s coming.

Picnic PostNL’s presence also explains the eventual result: their leader Pavel BITTNER finished 5th, and the team had MÄRKL and VAN DEN BROEK inside the top 30 (23rd and 26th), making them one of the most complete teams in the front of this stage.

4 → 2.5 km: The Final Surge

10 seconds per kilometer—the highest compression rate of the day. SLOCK’s lead dropped from 25 seconds to 10 seconds.

From SLOCK’s perspective, this segment was the cruelest. When you look back and see the peloton transform from a distant blur of color into a formation where you can make out the jersey designs, you know it’s over. And by this point, he had been riding solo for nearly 38 kilometers, in the heat, on rolling roads, with no shelter whatsoever.

2.5 → 1.5 km: Closing the Net

The official account states he was absorbed with 1.5 km to go; ProCyclingUK’s report writes it as “caught just before the final kilometer.” The two descriptions don’t contradict each other—just a difference in observation point—so both are listed here.

From a chase-efficiency standpoint, this was a textbook-level catch—absorbing the rider with less than 2 km remaining compresses the window for any counter-attack to zero. Anyone hoping to launch a counter as soon as the escapee was caught would find a full-speed sprint train ahead with no gap to exploit.

What This Curve Tells Us

Connecting the eight time points, the chase slope is not linear but two-phase: the first 20 kilometers barely move (1 to 1.5 seconds per kilometer), and the final 8 kilometers compress violently (5 to 10 seconds per kilometer).

This is precisely the standard operating procedure for a modern Tour de France flat stage. The peloton chasing a lone breakaway is not about chasing early, but about chasing late yet chasing hard enough. The reason is simple: energy is finite, and aerodynamic drag grows with the square of speed. Rather than grinding away at moderate intensity for 40 kilometers, it is better to devour the gap in 8 kilometers at extremely high intensity—the latter’s total energy expenditure is lower, and it merges the sprint train’s high-output segment with the chase segment, killing two birds with one stone.

For Taiwanese cyclists, this section carries a direct lesson: when you chase down a rider who has escaped during a group ride, the most efficient approach is often not to surge immediately, but to first organize the formation, stabilize the pace of the rotating pull, and then concentrate your firepower in the final stretch. This point will be expanded further in Section 14.

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8. Race Report (5): A Sprint Torn Apart by Van der Poel and Saved by Merlier

In the final 1.5 kilometers, Sloak was absorbed, and the race became a pure bunch sprint. But this sprint was anything but a “clean train duel”—it was a melee.

XDS Astana Leads into the Final Corner

The official race report states that XDS ASTANA led into the final corner, and ALPECIN-DECEUNINCK was also in an excellent position.

Astana had been working at the front for the entire final 10 kilometers, with Kanthak as their lead man. Judging by the result (Kanthak ultimately finished 9th), their return on investment was not high, but leading into the final corner itself carries tactical value—controlling the order of entry into the final corner effectively decides who can launch their sprint first out of the corner.

And Alpecin being in a good position means the lessons accumulated over the previous two days had been corrected: this time, Van der Poel and Philipsen were in the right place.

Van der Poel’s Turn: Power So Great It Split the Sprint Group

Van der Poel once again delivered Philipsen to the front. The official race report used a striking description: Van der Poel’s turn was so powerful it split the sprint group—he, Philipsen, and a handful of others opened a gap to those behind.

This moment was one of the most dramatic of the stage. At that instant, the picture suggested that Philipsen had finally gotten the ideal launch pad he had been waiting for all week: the world’s strongest lead-out man opening the road ahead, rivals separated by the gap behind, and only a few hundred meters remaining.

But there is a subtle physical and tactical trap here, worth unpacking analytically:

Van der Poel splitting the sprint group was not entirely good news for Philipsen.

The reason is—when the lead-out man accelerates so hard that he opens a gap to the riders behind, those dropped are certainly disadvantaged, but the sprinter following directly behind the lead-out man is also forced to sustain a longer stretch of self-powered output. Once the gap forms, no one behind Philipsen can disrupt him, but it also means: at the moment Van der Poel hands off, he must complete the remaining distance alone from an already very high speed, and on a slightly uphill road.

In other words, this turn delivered Philipsen to the very front, and also exposed him at the very front. And in the world of sprinting, the front is always the most expensive position.

Merlier Boxed In, Then Plugged the Gap Himself

At the same time, Merlier’s situation was dire. The official race report recorded: his position was not ideal, and he was boxed in before the final corner, even momentarily thinking the chance was gone.

Being boxed in is the sprinter’s worst nightmare—you are surrounded by riders to your left, right, and front, with no exit, and can only wait for others to move first. At the high speed of the final kilometer, every second of delay means the gap ahead opens by several more meters.

What followed was the most brilliant part of this stage. Merlier did three things:

1. He accelerated on his own to catch the wheels of the leading few—no teammates, no train, just closing the gap by himself.
2. He plugged the gap himself—this was a dual test of fitness and judgment. Close it too early, and you have nothing left to sprint; close it too late, and you will never catch up.
3. He waited until 250 meters remained before going full gas—this was the single most critical decision of the entire race.

The third point deserves special emphasis. Starting the real sprint with only 250 meters remaining, on a slightly uphill finishing straight, was a very bold but also very correct choice. As we analyzed earlier, this road punishes those who launch too early (Sloak demonstrated this once with his intermediate sprint). Merlier was essentially betting all his remaining matches on that final stretch.

200 Meters to Go: Coquard and Merlier Pass Philipsen Together

With 200 meters to the finish, Coquard and Merlier passed Philipsen together.

This single line of the report is essentially the verdict of the entire sprint. Philipsen was still at the front with 200 meters remaining—meaning he had been leading for quite some distance. And being overtaken by two riders simultaneously in the final 200 meters on a slight uphill has only one explanation: he had launched too early, and his speed was already fading.

Coquard’s performance this stage was equally commendable. Having just taken his first career Grand Tour stage win on Stage 5, he again found a line through the melee and passed Philipsen, ultimately taking 3rd place—his positioning and timing of acceleration were both on the right track.

Final 50 Meters: Everyone Was Slowing, Merlier Slowed Less

The official report states: Merlier was already slowing in the final 50 meters, but he still held on for the victory.

This sentence deserves to be magnified. It simultaneously illustrates three things:

1. This slightly uphill finishing straight is genuinely brutal. Even the sprinter in the best form of the moment could not maintain maximum speed to the line.
2. Merlier’s limit had been fully drained—he was boxed in first, then closed the gap himself, then went full gas from 250 meters. Stack those three efforts together, and anyone would fade at the end.
3. He still won, because Gilme (2nd) and Coquard (3rd) were also fading on the same uphill, and they had launched from further back.

So the final order was: Merlier 1st, Gilme 2nd, Coquard 3rd, Philipsen 4th, Bittner 5th, followed in order by Plummer, Ackermann (Pascal ACKERMANN), Russo (Clément RUSSO), Kanthak, and Frétin.

Two Ways to Win

The race report delivered a precise closing note: this was a victory of a completely different nature from Bordeaux.

• Stage 7, Bordeaux: Soudal’s train delivered Merlier cleanly into position, and he only needed to explode at the right moment. That was a team victory.
• Stage 8, Bergerac: Merlier was boxed in, saved himself, filled the gap, and exploded again. That was an individual victory, where improvisation in the moment far outweighed any plan.

A sprinter winning on two consecutive days in two completely different ways is proof that both his form and his ability are at their peak.

9. Results Analysis: Commentary on the Top 10 and Full Top 30

The stage was completed in 3:52:50. Based on the official distance of 180.4 kilometers, the average speed for the entire stage was approximately 46.5 km/h—on a route with 1,150 meters of climbing, hot weather, rolling terrain, and narrow streets, this figure demonstrates that the intensity of a modern Tour de France flat stage can no longer be dismissed as “easy cruising.”

Top 10 Analysis

1. Tim MERLIER (SOUDAL QUICK-STEP)
Back-to-back wins, his personal 5th Tour de France stage victory, and the first sprinter since Philipsen in 2023 to win two consecutive stages at the Tour. This win carries more weight than the day before: winning without a lead-out train, boxed in, and having to close gaps on his own proves pure top-end speed and racecraft.

2. Biniam GIRMAY (NSN CYCLING TEAM)
On the podium for the second straight day, still without a win. But looking at the full stage, NSN’s tactical execution was one of the best of the day — conserving energy entirely in the opening phase, saving all resources for the leader’s legs, and collecting 2nd in the final melee. His points jumped from 145 to 203; that’s the real takeaway.

3. Olav KOOIJ (DECATHLON CMA CGM TEAM)
Having just taken his first Grand Tour stage win on Stage 5, he surged past Philipsen alongside Merlier with 200 meters to go, proving Stage 5 wasn’t a gift from a dropped rival. His points went from 70 to 110.

4. Jasper PHILIPSEN (ALPECIN-PREMIER TECH)
The most unfortunate name of the day. He took the intermediate sprint for the best in the group, and at the finish he had the launch pad Van der Poel built with his own hands — only to be overtaken in the final 200 meters. Across three genuine sprint opportunities, his results are Pau 5th, Bordeaux 5th, Bergerac 4th — the placings are improving, but the win remains elusive.

5. Pavel BITTNER (TEAM PICNIC POSTNL)
Picnic PostNL stretched the train with Astana with 4 kilometers remaining, and Bittner reaped the rewards. For a sprinter still building his Grand Tour credentials, taking 5th in that kind of chaos is a solid day.

6. Rick PLUIMERS (TUDOR PRO CYCLING TEAM)
Tudor sent riders to the front with 10 kilometers to go, ultimately converting that into 6th place. For a team still fighting for a permanent spot in the three Grand Tours, this is effective exposure and a tangible result.

7. Pascal ACKERMANN (TEAM JAYCO ALULA)
Taking 7th without any obvious lead-out support came down to veteran positioning. Jayco AlUla also had Mauro SCHMID in 22nd on this stage.

8. Clément RUSSO (GROUPAMA-FDJ UNITED)
A French team in the top 10 on a French stage — a good story for the home crowd and the sponsors alike. Teammate Quentin PACHER was 20th.

9. Max KANTER (XDS ASTANA TEAM)
Astana committed riders to the front from 10 kilometers out, led all the way into the final corner, and got only 9th for it — the worst return on investment of the day. That said, Kanter took 2nd in the intermediate sprint, boosting his points from 140 to 172 and holding his position in the green jersey standings.

10. Milan FRETIN (COFIDIS)
Cofidis likewise joined the chase from 10 kilometers out; 10th is an acceptable return.

Official Full Results — Top 30

Rank	Rider	Team	Finish Time	Gap
1	Tim MERLIER	SOUDAL QUICK-STEP	3:52:50	Winner
2	Biniam GIRMAY	NSN CYCLING TEAM	3:52:50	Same time
3	Olav KOOIJ	DECATHLON CMA CGM TEAM	3:52:50	Same time
4	Jasper PHILIPSEN	ALPECIN-PREMIER TECH	3:52:50	Same time
5	Pavel BITTNER	TEAM PICNIC POSTNL	3:52:50	Same time
6	Rick PLUIMERS	TUDOR PRO CYCLING TEAM	3:52:50	Same time
7	Pascal ACKERMANN	TEAM JAYCO ALULA	3:52:50	Same time
8	Clément RUSSO	GROUPAMA-FDJ UNITED	3:52:50	Same time
9	Max KANTER	XDS ASTANA TEAM	3:52:50	Same time
10	Milan FRETIN	COFIDIS	3:52:50	Same time
11	Soren WÆRENSKJOLD	UNO-X MOBILITY	3:52:50	Same time
12	Mads PEDERSEN	LIDL-TREK	3:52:50	Same time
13	Fernando GAVIRIA RENDON	CAJA RURAL-SEGUROS RGA	3:52:50	Same time
14	Dorian GODON	NETCOMPANY INEOS CYCLING TEAM	3:52:50	Same time
15	Anthony TURGIS	TOTALENERGIES	3:52:50	Same time
16	Mathieu VAN DER POEL	ALPECIN-PREMIER TECH	3:52:50	Same time
17	Phil BAUHAUS	BAHRAIN VICTORIOUS	3:52:50	Same time
18	Jenno BERCKMOES	LOTTO INTERMARCHE	3:52:50	Same time
19	Fred WRIGHT	PINARELLO-Q36.5 PRO CYCLING TEAM	3:52:50	Same time
20	Quentin PACHER	GROUPAMA-FDJ UNITED	3:52:50	Same time
21	Anthon CHARMIG	UNO-X MOBILITY	3:52:50	Same time
22	Mauro SCHMID	TEAM JAYCO ALULA	3:52:50	Same time
23	Niklas MÄRKL	TEAM PICNIC POSTNL	3:52:50	Same time
24	Aurélien PARET PEINTRE	DECATHLON CMA CGM TEAM	3:52:50	Same time
25	Tom PIDCOCK	PINARELLO-Q36.5 PRO CYCLING TEAM	3:52:50	Same time
26	Frank VAN DEN BROEK	TEAM PICNIC POSTNL	3:52:50	Same time
27	Mike TEUNISSEN	XDS ASTANA TEAM	3:52:50	Same time
28	Anders SKAARSETH	UNO-X MOBILITY	3:52:50	Same time
29	Tobias JOHANNESSEN	UNO-X MOBILITY	3:52:50	Same time
30	Remco EVENEPOEL	RED BULL - BORA - HANSGROHE	3:52:50	Same time

What This Table Tells Us

First, all top 30 finished with the same time. This means the peloton arrived at the finish line intact, with no time splits. For GC riders, this is the ideal outcome.

Second, UNO-X MOBILITY placed four riders in the top 30 (11th, 21st, 28th, and 29th). They joined the chase with 10 km remaining, and their leader WÆRENSKJOLD took 11th — just off the podium, but the team’s overall performance was extremely solid. Considering they lost yellow jersey wearer TRÆEN on Stage 7, this team display deserves a mention.

Third, Tom PIDCOCK (25th) and Remco EVENEPOEL (30th) appear on the list. Both are GC contenders, yet they finished in the lower end of the sprint positions — this shows they deliberately kept themselves in the safe front part of the peloton, a standard tactic to protect their overall standings.

Fourth, Lotto Intermarché’s Jenno BERCKMOES finished 18th. This team kept Van Eetvelt at the front all day while still managing to get a rider a decent finish, showing quite efficient use of their resources.

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10. The Four Jerseys and Points: Green Jersey Battle Narrows from 59 Points to 15

General Classification (GC): No Change at All

After Stage 8, the GC ranks and gaps are exactly the same as the previous day:

Rank	Rider	Cumulative Time / Gap
1	POGACAR	28h49’07"
2	VINGEGAARD	+2’42"
3	DEL TORO	+3’27"
4	EVENEPOEL	+3’30"
5	AYUSO	+3’34"
6	SEIXAS	+3’55"
7	LIPOWITZ	+4’00"
8	L. MARTINEZ	+4’21"
9	SKJELMOSE	+4’57"
10	VACEK	+7’10"
11	BERNAL	+9’12"
12	QUINN	+9’35"
13	JOHANNESSEN	+9’42"
14	VAN WILDER	+9’45"
15	PIDCOCK	+9’50"

Pogačar came through the peloton safely and continues to wear the yellow jersey. For him and UAE TEAM EMIRATES XRG, a day where “nothing happened” is the best kind of day.

Green Jersey: The Real Battleground of This Stage

This is where Stage 8 truly changed things.

Rank	Rider	After Stage 7	After Stage 8	Gain
1	PEDERSEN	204	228	+24
2	MERLIER	134	213	+79
3	GIRMAY	145	203	+58
4	PHILIPSEN	126	175	+49
5	KANTER	140	172	+32
6	KOOIJ	70	110	+40
7	WÆRENSKJOLD	73	89	+16
8	TURGIS	64	79	+15
9	POGACAR	75	75	0
10	VINGEGAARD	61	61	0

The change in the lead margin is the most important number of this stage: it shrank from 59 points to 15.

After Stage 7, Pedersen led second place (Girmay) by 59 points; after Stage 8, his lead over second place (Merlier) is just 15 points. In a single day, the green jersey’s cushion was cut by three-quarters.

What happened? Pedersen only scored 24 points today—he took 3rd in the intermediate sprint and finished 12th at the line. Merlier, meanwhile, banked 79 points in one day (stage win plus intermediate sprint points). This is the essence of the green jersey points system: on flat stages, the stage win points are the biggest lever, and any lead built by “consistently picking up mid-pack points every day” can be wiped out by a single victory.

Even more noteworthy is the density from 2nd to 5th place: Merlier 213, Girmay 203, Philipsen 175, Kanter 172. These four riders are packed within 41 points of each other, and all of them can overtake one another in the same sprint. The green jersey battle has formally shifted from “Pedersen leading through versatility” to a genuine back-and-forth contest.

Looking at the route structure, Pedersen’s advantage remains: he can score on hilly stages and medium-difficulty finishes, while pure sprinters often get dropped on those days. But his weakness is equally clear—on pure flat stages, he cannot match the top-end speed of riders like Merlier. Over the next three weeks, the direction of the green jersey will likely hinge on the ratio of “pure sprint stages” to “hilly stages.”

Polka Dot Jersey: Climbing Points Unchanged

Rank	Rider	Points
1	POGACAR	28
2	VINGEGAARD	19
3	L. MARTINEZ	16
4	BAUDIN	13
5	V. PARET PEINTRE	12
6	DEL TORO	10
7	LIPOWITZ	10
8	PRODHOMME	9
9	PIDCOCK	7

Both climbing points on this stage were taken by Slock, but his total is not enough to break into the top of the standings, so the order remains completely unchanged. Pogacar leads with 28 points, with the polka dot jersey practically worn by the second-placed rider—standard procedure when the yellow jersey also leads another classification.

White Jersey: Del Toro Holds Firm

The best young rider remains Isaac DEL TORO (UAE TEAM EMIRATES XRG). He also sits 3rd overall, and the white jersey battle is unfolding among riders ranked 3rd to 6th overall—Ayuso, SEIXAS, and L. MARTINEZ are all from the same generation. This stage had no impact on the white jersey.

Team Classification and Most Combative Award

• Team classification leader: LIDL-TREK
• Most combative rider of the stage: Liam SLOCK (LOTTO INTERMARCHE)

Slock’s most combative award is entirely deserved—he attacked from km 3, spent about 176 kilometers at the front, took both climbing points of the stage, and soloed until 1.5 kilometers remained. This is also Lotto Intermarché’s second consecutive day taking this award (Stage 7 went to Wærenskjold).

11. Team Tactical Review: Five Strategies, Five Costs

Alpecin-Premier Tech: Two Days of Doing Things Right, Two Days Without a Win

This is the most discussion-worthy case of the stage.

What did Alpecin do right today? They took control of the pace early, ensuring the breakaway wouldn’t get away; they positioned well before the final corner; their lead-out man Van der Poel delivered a pull in the final kilometer strong enough to tear the sprinting peloton apart. In terms of process, this was almost flawless execution.

So why did they still lose? Analysis reveals three layers:

First, that pull may have been too strong. As mentioned earlier, when the lead-out’s acceleration is so hard it opens a gap, the sprinter is left to face a longer final stretch alone. Philipsen was still at the front with 200 meters remaining, yet was overtaken by Kooij and Merlier simultaneously—this can almost only be explained as “he launched from too far out.” The ideal delivery isn’t putting your sprinter at the very front, but putting him in a position to strike from second or third wheel at the right moment. The difference is only a few dozen meters, yet it’s the difference between winning and losing.

Second, the slight uphill finish amplified this mistake. On flat ground, launching a few dozen meters early might still hold; on a slight incline, speed decay is mercilessly magnified.

Third, there’s an element of luck. Three sprint opportunities yielded 5th, 5th, and 4th—this distribution isn’t a capability issue, it’s “just barely missing out every time.” This is common in professional cycling, but the psychological toll on the rider is immense.

Alpecin’s solution, from an analytical standpoint, is actually straightforward: next time, have Van der Poel ease off slightly and push the handoff point 50 to 80 meters closer to the finish, so Philipsen’s final full sprint lands within 200 meters, rather than 250 to 300.

Soudal Quick-Step: Low-Key, Efficient, Spending Energy in the Right Places

What the Wolfpack did today looks costly on the surface—they were the team that spent the most energy controlling the pace all day, and they had only just won the day before.

But looking at the full day, this investment was calculated:

1. Pacing ensured a bunch sprint. Merlier is the fastest man in this group; as long as the race ends in a mass sprint, he is the most probable winner. Spending energy to “steer the race toward your home turf” is the most cost-effective expenditure.
2. They didn’t fight for the lead-out train in the final 10 kilometers. Official records show Astana, Tudor, Cofidis, Decathlon, NSN, and Uno-X at the front in the final 10 km—Soudal was not among them. This means they saved their teammates’ energy for the earlier pacing and left the final positioning to Merlier himself.
3. The result proved the bet right—even with Merlier boxed in, even having to save himself, he still won.

This is a team philosophy of “trusting your sprinter in the final 300 meters.” The risk is high (getting boxed in could mean nothing), but when your sprinter is one of the fastest in the world, that risk is acceptable.

Lotto Intermarché: The Business Logic of Buying Visibility with Long Attacks

Lotto Intermarché’s entire week of operations is a masterclass in the business model of professional cycling.

They lost Arnaud De Lie early in the season, which meant their ability to win flat stages dropped to zero. For a team needing to prove its value to sponsors, only two paths remained: either hope someone emerges in the mountains, or put riders in the breakaway every single day.

They chose the latter, and executed it with total commitment:

• Stage 7: Vanstroem wins the most combative rider award.
• Stage 8: Slock attacks from km 3, spends roughly 176 km at the front, takes two KOM points, wins the most combative award, and rides solo until 1.5 km to go.
• Same day, a teammate even tried to slow the peloton through a corner with 8 km remaining to buy him time—a move that was almost certainly doomed to fail, but it put the team on camera once more.
• And, they still had Beekmoes finishing 18th at the line.

Calculated by “seconds of TV exposure,” Slock was likely one of the riders with the most camera time that day. Converted into advertising value for sponsors, this is far more valuable than a 15th place. The business logic of the Tour de France has never been that only victories count.

Of course, the cost is real: Slock effectively burned a massive amount of energy that day, and his output over the following days will drop. But for a team in this situation, it’s a necessary trade.

NSN Cycling Team: The Art of Wheelsucking

NSN’s strategy that day was the most economical on the road. The official race report clearly documents their logic: since Soudal and Alpecin were willing to chase the break, Girmay’s team would conserve energy.

This “wheelsucking” is sometimes criticized in the pro peloton, but from the perspective of maximizing win probability, it is entirely rational:

• Your leader wins a chaotic sprint with explosive power in the final 300 meters, not with the number of teammates.
• Spending energy controlling the pace for the first 100 km only hurts the leader’s final kick, with zero benefit.
• Soudal and Alpecin have far stronger incentives to chase anyway (one defending its title, the other desperate for a first win), so they won’t let it go.

The result: Girmay finishes 2nd, his points tally rising from 145 to 203. And with 10 km to go, NSN did indeed join the chase—commit when it’s time to commit, never when it isn’t. It was a day of excellent judgment.

The only issue: two straight podiums, still no win. Judging by the process of Stage 8, what Girmay may lack isn’t the legs, but a reliable wheel in the final 500 meters. This is the flip side of the “conserving energy” strategy—when you do nothing all day, there’s no teammate left in front of you at the end.

XDS Astana, Picnic PostNL, Tudor, Cofidis: The Cost-Benefit of Short Lead-Out Trains

These four teams all did the same thing in the final 10 km: send riders to the front to lift the pace.

The results: Kanter 9th, Bittner 5th, Pluimers 6th, Fretin 10th.

From a cost-benefit perspective:

• Astana lost the most. They were at the front from 10 km out and even led into the final corner, yet only managed 9th. Controlling the entry into the corner without converting it into a higher placing means the leader’s top speed simply isn’t enough at this level of sprinting.
• Picnic PostNL gained the most. They extended the train alongside Astana with 4 km to go, Bittner took 5th, and two other teammates finished in the top 30.
• Tudor and Cofidis roughly broke even. 6th and 10th are reasonable returns given where these teams stand.

There’s a broader observation here: in a Tour de France packed with elite sprinters, the function of a “short train” isn’t to manufacture a victory, but to keep your leader from being swallowed up. These teams don’t have the resources to build a full lead-out train like Soudal or Alpecin, but they can at least ensure their leader appears in the top 15 rather than watching the sprint from 40th place. That’s also why, with 10 km to go, it was these teams fighting to get to the front—not Soudal.

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12. Individual Rider Stories: Four Trajectories Worth Remembering

Merlier: Two Ways to Win, One Level of Class

At Bordeaux on Stage 7 and Bergerac on Stage 8, Merlier won in two completely opposite ways.

• Bordeaux: Soudal’s train delivered him cleanly into position. This was a “victory of the system”—you just ensure the leader is in the right place at the right time, and leave the rest to his top speed.
• Bergerac: His position was poor, he got boxed in before the final corner, and for a moment he thought the chance was gone; then he accelerated himself onto the wheels of the riders ahead, closed the gap himself, only fully committed with 250 meters to go, and was fading in the final 50 meters yet still held on.

The second kind of win is far harder than the first. It requires three things to align simultaneously: sufficient reserve energy (to still have firepower after closing the gap), impeccable timing judgment (the 250-meter point can’t be earlier or later), and an absolute advantage in top speed (to beat Girmay and Coquard on the slight uphill).

This victory was his 5th career Tour de France stage win, and made him the first sprinter to win back-to-back stages at the Tour since Philipsen in 2023. The significance of this record: sprint competition in the modern Tour has become so fierce that “winning two days in a row” is now a rare event—the lead-out trains are too evenly matched, and any single day’s variables can rewrite the outcome. Winning two days straight means form, judgment, and luck are all on your side.

Slock: One Man’s 177 Kilometers

Liam Slock’s trajectory that day deserves to be recorded on its own:

Time Point	What Happened
km 3	Attacks
km 6	Three-rider break forms
km 58	Lead reaches day’s maximum of 2’15"
km 102.6	1st over the top of Côte de Domme, takes KOM points
Intermediate sprint after Domme	Goes too early, loses to Otruba
km 140.4	1st over the top of Côte du Buisson-de-Cadouin, sweeps both KOM points of the day, and goes solo over the top
20 km to go	Still 1’20" ahead
1.5 km to go	Caught by the peloton
After the race	Awarded the day’s most combative rider

From km 3 to 1.5 km remaining, he spent roughly 176 km at the front, the final nearly 39 km of it alone.

The only “technical error” he made that day was going too early in the intermediate sprint—but that hardly mattered, because that score was never his objective from the start. What’s truly worth learning is his management of task priorities: allocating his limited energy, in order, to the KOM points, the drama of a solo move, and extending his lead time as long as possible. He knew full well he couldn’t win, so he went out and took everything that was available to someone who couldn’t win.

Otruba and Guernalec: A Day for the Wildcard and the Home Team

Jakub Otruba (Caja Rural-Seguros RGA) was the first rider to attack after the flag drop according to the official record, the one who beat Slock in the intermediate sprint, and took 2nd on both category-4 climbs. For a wildcard team, this was a nearly perfect day—on camera all day long, and beating a WorldTour rider in the details once. His teammate Gaviria (Fernando GAVIRIA RENDON) took 13th at the finish, and the team’s visibility that day was maxed out.

Thibault Guernalec (TotalEnergies) had a simpler role: a French rider in a breakaway on a French stage—TotalEnergies’ signature move for years. He was dropped on the Buisson-de-Cadouin, the first of the three to crack—but he made it to 140 km, so the job was done. His teammate Turgis (Anthony TURGIS) finished 15th.

Philipsen: The Demon of Waiting

Three sprint opportunities, with results of 5th in Pau, 5th in Bordeaux, and 4th in Bergerac.

Stage 8 was the hardest one for him to digest. He showed the best burst in the peloton during the intermediate sprint (beating Kante and Pedersen), and at the finish he got a launchpad built by Van der Poel himself, so powerful it split the sprinting group apart. All the conditions were in place, yet in the final 200 meters, two riders passed him simultaneously.

From a purely technical standpoint, this was a timing issue, not an ability issue. But sprinting is a discipline highly dependent on confidence—when a rider comes up “just short” for several days in a row, the next time he faces not just his opponents’ legs, but also the timer in his own head. Go too early and fear fading; go too late and fear not making it. This hesitation itself slows the reaction by half a beat.

The good news is that his points have risen from 126 to 175, still firmly in 4th place on the green jersey standings, and his sprint placings have been trending upward (5, 5, 4). Over the length of a three-week race, he still has plenty of opportunities.

13. The Tour de France Archives of Bergerac and Périgueux

2017: Kittel’s Bergerac

The last time Bergerac welcomed a Tour de France winner was Marcel KITTEL in 2017. And that stage also started from Périgueux, with a route very similar to the 2026 stage.

This comparison is quite interesting. In 2017, Kittel was at the peak of his career, one of the most dominant pure sprinters of his era. Nine years later, with the same city pairing and the same route skeleton, the winner has changed to Merlier—in a sense, this was a changing-of-the-guard ceremony for sprinters.

At the same time, this also illustrates ASO’s route design philosophy: this road to Bergerac is designed for sprinters. The official classification calls it Flat, not because the road is truly flat, but because historically, it has always ended in a bunch sprint. That was the case in 2017, and it was the case in 2026 as well.

2014: A Reverse Individual Time Trial

Another must-mention is the 2014 Tour de France individual time trial (ITT): the route was Bergerac → Périgueux, exactly the reverse of the 2026 Stage 8, won by Germany’s Tony MARTIN.

This comparison has technical implications. ITT route selection has strict requirements—good road surface, few corners, gentle elevation changes, and the ability for riders to maintain a stable aerodynamic position. The fact that ASO deemed the road from Bergerac to Périgueux suitable as a time trial course in 2014 indirectly confirms its road character: this is a road that allows sustained high-speed cruising.

Comparing this with the current stage makes it clear: this road can indeed be ridden very fast (the stage average speed was about 46.5 km/h), but it is not without undulation—it just undulates “smoothly,” the kind of terrain that lets time trialists hold their rhythm while slowly grinding down the riders at the back of the peloton.

Earlier Eras in the City Archives

CTYeh’s race city archives also record that the city of Périgueux is connected to the Tour de France histories of Anquetil (1961) and Indurain (1994). These are narratives at the city-archive level, so we won’t expand on the details here—but it’s worth noting that these names are all GC champions of the time trialist type, which again echoes the observation from the previous section: the roads of the Dordogne have long been used by the Tour to test the ability to sustain high speed.

Why ASO Keeps Returning to the Dordogne

From a race operations perspective, there are several reasons why the Dordogne department is a regular stop for ASO:

1. Geographical location: Situated between the Pyrenees and the Massif Central, it is the natural corridor for the “transition from the southern mountains toward the center” in a three-week race. Stage 6 had just finished over the Tourmalet, and Stage 10 heads into the Massif Central; there need to be some bridging stages in between.
2. Tourism value: The Dordogne Valley, “most beautiful villages in France” like Domme, and the vineyards of Bergerac—these are excellent material for live aerial footage. A large portion of the Tour’s revenue comes from tourism promotion partnerships, and the route itself is a six-hour travel advertisement.
3. Road network flexibility: The roads here can produce pure flat stages or rolling stages with 1,150 meters of climbing, depending on what kind of race the organizer wants.

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14. Impact on Subsequent Stages

The Next Day: The Corrèze Rolling Stage

Right after Stage 8 comes Stage 9, the Corrèze rolling stage. This stage’s character is completely different from Stage 8—it is not a pure sprint stage.

Looking back at the results, the most aggressive rider award for Stage 9 went to Mathieu van der Poel, while Pedersen’s points went from 228 to 268 (+40), Girmay from 203 to 223 (+20), and Merlier did not add a single point to his 213.

This precisely validates the earlier analysis of the green jersey race: on rolling stages, pure sprinters don’t score points, but Pedersen does. After Stage 8, his lead had been cut to just 15 points; by the end of Stage 9, he had stretched it back out to 45 points (268 vs. Girmay’s 223).

This is the core dynamic of the green jersey battle: a pure sprinter can slash 40 points off a rival’s lead in a single flat stage, but as soon as there’s one rolling stage, the all-rounder Pedersen can earn it all back in a day.

GC: A Minor Reshuffle After Stage 9

After Stage 9, the top nine positions and time gaps in the general classification remained completely unchanged (POGACAR 32h17’04", VINGEGAARD +2’42", all the way down to SKJELMOSE +4’57"), but changes began to appear from 10th place onward:

• VACEK was dropped in the chaos at the front of the race and fell out of the top 15.
• JOHANNESSEN and PIDCOCK gained time bonuses by participating in the breakaway and moved up (to 11th and 13th, respectively).

This is also the typical effect of a rolling stage—it doesn’t change the true front of the GC, but it reshuffles the 8th-to-20th place range. For the riders who got through Stage 8 safely in the peloton, this is the insurance their conservative riding all day bought them.

Energy Management Before the Rest Day

After Stage 9 comes the first rest day of this Tour (July 13). Stage 10 is the Aurillac → Le Lioran stage on July 14, France’s National Day, officially entering the Massif Central.

From a training science perspective, Stage 8’s position in the first week is quite delicate:

• It is the buffer between the first week’s mountains (Pyrenees) and the second phase of mountains (Massif Central).
• But it is not easy—180 kilometers, 1,150 meters of climbing, high temperatures, and a high-intensity chase in the final 40 kilometers.
• For sprinters, this is a day to go all out, because once they enter the Massif Central, opportunities will diminish significantly.
• For GC riders, this is a day to conserve as much as possible, because the intensity after the rest day will only be higher.

One race, two completely opposite strategies—this is precisely what makes grand tours so fascinating.

The Subsequent Pressure on Alpecin and Philipsen

Looking at the race structure, after entering the Massif Central, there will be a gap in pure flat sprint opportunities. For Philipsen, who has already missed three times, this means the next opportunity might be several days away. This waiting will amplify the psychological pressure, and it means Alpecin must execute their lead-out even more precisely than in Stage 8 when the next chance arrives.

Conversely, after Merlier’s back-to-back wins, the question becomes maintaining his energy and the sprint train. Two consecutive days of all-out sprinting (especially the self-rescue style high expenditure of Stage 8), combined with the upcoming mountains, will deplete his reserves. His advantage lies in Soudal’s smart resource allocation—they didn’t fight hard in the final 10 kilometers, which preserved energy for his teammates.

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15. A Taiwanese Cycling Fan’s Perspective: Five Things to Learn from This Stage

1. Long-Distance Cruising That “Looks Easy but Grinds You Down with Small Climbs and Wind”

The character of Stage 8 is actually very familiar to Taiwanese cyclists. Officially labeled Flat, but the database says HILLY—this kind of discrepancy is everywhere on long routes in Taiwan.

Think about these roads:

• The West Coast Expressway (Provincial Highway 61): On the map, it’s a straight coastal line that looks completely flat. Anyone who has actually ridden it knows that river-crossing bridges come one after another, and each bridge is a short climb; add in the sea wind, and the cumulative fatigue over a full day far exceeds what the elevation gain on paper suggests.
• The first section of the South-Link Highway (the starting stretch from Pingtung toward Taitung): Before the real big climb of the South-Link, that undulating stretch has already worn your legs down a layer.
• The Huatung Valley (Provincial Highway 9): Famous for being “flat,” but in reality it’s a continuous series of gentle ups and downs over tens of meters, plus shifting valley winds—if you don’t pace yourself well, it’s easy to blow up in the second half.

The training focus for this kind of route isn’t “climbing ability,” but power stability. Stage 8 is 180 km with 1,150 m of elevation gain at an average speed of 46.5 km/h—translated into amateur cyclist terms: you must not let your power spike across dozens of small undulations.

Practical advice: On this kind of road, set a power ceiling you can sustain for over 4 hours (use a power meter if you have one; otherwise, use heart rate or breathing rhythm). Allow your speed to drop on small climbs, but do not allow your power to exceed the ceiling. Most people blow up because they can’t stand being overtaken on a small climb.

2. Positioning in the Peloton and “Grabbing Position Before the Corner”

The pinch point on the narrow streets of Domme in Stage 8 demonstrated how pro riders handle an “upcoming narrowing of the road”: everyone starts moving forward 2 to 3 km before entering it.

This applies equally to group rides and amateur races in Taiwan:

• Before entering a corner, position matters more than speed. Corners stretch the peloton out; if you enter the corner at the back, the acceleration cost after exiting will be much higher.
• The repeated accordion effect is the biggest energy killer. Every time you brake and re-accelerate at the back of the group, it’s like doing a high-intensity interval. Over 100 km, you might do it 50 times—no wonder you’re more tired than the riders at the front even though you never pulled.
• The solution is to move up early, not to surge hard. In the 500 meters to 1 km before a corner, bridge, village, or road narrowing, gradually move up 10 to 20 bike lengths. That’s far more efficient than chasing hard after the corner.

3. Sprint Pacing on a Slight Uphill Finish

The finishing straight in Bergerac slopes gently upward, which is very useful for Taiwanese cyclists—many amateur race finishes in Taiwan are also on slight uphills (the levee exit on riverside courses, the final stretch of campus circuit races, and the finish villages of many mountain races).

Three things to learn from Stage 8:

1. A slight uphill magnifies the penalty for “launching too early” several times over. Van der Poel launched too early in the intermediate sprint and lost; Philipsen launched too early at the finish and was overtaken—two demonstrations on the same day.
2. Merlier waited until 250 meters to go before going full gas. For amateur riders, if the finish is a slight uphill, keeping your full-effort distance between 150 and 250 meters is much safer than 300 meters or more.
3. Everyone slows down; the key is who slows down the least. This means that in a slight-uphill sprint, your goal isn’t to reach maximum speed, but to reach the maximum speed you can still hold to the finish line. These are two different things, and the difference can be the deciding factor in your placing.

Training method: Find a 300-to-400-meter stretch with a 1% to 2% gradient, and do repeat efforts of “full gas for the final 200 meters.” The key is to record your speed at the finish line, not your top speed. You’ll find that moving your launch point back 50 meters actually gives you a higher finish-line speed.

4. Pacing Management for a Solo Breakaway—Van der Poel Is the Best Lesson

Van der Poel’s day was a perfect case study for amateur riders learning “solo pacing.”

His situation: out front from km 3, alone for the final 39 km, with his lead eaten from 1’40" all the way down to zero. There are several key decision points worth breaking down:

• He fought for points on the climbs (taking 1st at both Domme and Buisson-de-Cadouin). This was a move of “spending energy to buy guaranteed returns”—he knew he couldn’t win the stage, so he invested his energy in things he could get.
• He launched too early in the intermediate sprint and lost. This proves that fighting for points has a cost; energy isn’t unlimited.
• He went solo over the top of the climb. This was his boldest decision, and it was the source of his visibility that day.

A comparison for amateur riders: when you decide to ride off the front in a race or group ride, first ask yourself, “What is my goal?”

• If your goal is to win, then you need to carefully calculate the chasing ability behind you, and save all your energy for maintaining speed—don’t fight for anything you don’t need along the way.
• If your goal is experience, practice, or some kind of personal record, then ride at your own pace and enjoy the time at the front.
• The worst case is not having a clear goal—wanting to win while also fighting for every KOM on every small climb, and ending up with neither.

Another technical point: when riding solo, your power must be one level lower than in the group, but absolutely steady. In the group, you can draft and surge intermittently; when solo, you have no chance to rest, and any power spike will cost you 20 minutes later. Van der Poel managed to stay at the front for 177 km thanks to exactly this discipline.

5. How to Train “Solo Pacing While Being Chased” in Taiwan

The final point is a concrete training suggestion. The last 40 km of Stage 8 was essentially a “one rider vs. the group” chase—and this is exactly the situation Taiwanese cyclists most often encounter in time trials, the bike leg of triathlons, or after getting dropped from a group ride.

Drill 1: Progressive-pressure solo ride
Pick a 20-to-30 km stretch that’s safe and undulating (certain sections of the West Coast Highway, the valley, or long riverside stretches all work). Set a steady power you can hold for 45 to 60 minutes, then increase the intensity progressively over the final 8 km—simulating the final stage of “knowing you’re about to be caught.” The key is to experience: can you, while fatigued, ride the last 8 km faster than the first 20?

Drill 2: Power capping on rolling terrain
On a route with continuous small climbs (such as the valley or hilly areas), set a power ceiling and make it a rule that you cannot exceed it on any single climb. Complete 2 hours of this. This drill is extremely boring, but it trains the most core ability of Stage 8—maintaining pacing discipline on undulating roads.

Drill 3: Slight-uphill finish sprint
As mentioned earlier, find a 1% to 2% gentle climb and practice launching from different distances (150, 200, 250, 300 meters), recording finish-line speed. Find your optimal launch distance. This number is different for everyone, depending on your anaerobic capacity and body weight.

Drill 4: Position-gaining simulation
In a safe group ride, deliberately practice “moving from 25th position to 8th position.” Don’t do it with hard surges—use the natural rhythm changes at corners, hilltops, and road-surface transitions to move up. This is the most energy-efficient way to manage your position, and it’s what pro riders do in the final 20 km.

16. Stage Wrap-Up: A Stage Where “Nothing Changed, Yet Everything Changed”

On the surface, Stage 8 was a day without surprises: officially classified as flat, and it indeed ended in a bunch sprint; the top 15 on GC saw their positions and time gaps not change by a single second; the Yellow Jersey, White Jersey, and Polka Dot Jersey all stayed on the same shoulders.

But when you unpack the details, this day was full of information:

Tactically, it demonstrated the standard operating procedure for how the modern Tour de France closes the net — barely any movement in the first 20 kilometers, violent compression in the final 8 kilometers, and a precise absorption of the breakaway with 1.5 kilometers remaining, squeezing the window for any counter-attack from behind to zero.

Strategically, it turned the Green Jersey battle from a one-sided runaway (59 points) into a genuine dogfight (15 points), and showed everyone: on a flat stage, the points earned from a stage victory are the biggest leverage of all.

On a human level, it gave us three stories worth remembering — Merlier winning again in a completely different way than the day before, Sloak spending 177 kilometers alone at the front, and Philipsen getting the perfect lead-out only to be passed in the final 200 meters.

On the route, it proved that “official classification” and “actual road feel” can be two different things. ASO labeling it Flat was correct (the result was a bunch sprint), and the CTYeh database labeling it HILLY was also correct (1,150 meters of climbing, two Category 4 climbs, and a slightly uphill finish). The two labels are simply looking at two different aspects of the same road.

And for Taiwanese cycling fans, perhaps the greatest value of this stage lies in that final point: the road you think is flat is often the most punishing one. The bridges on the West Coast Expressway, the gentle slopes of the East Rift Valley, the rolling terrain before the South Link — none of them appear on any “difficulty ranking,” but every single one of them tests your pacing discipline.

Stage 9 heads into the hills of Corrèze, then a rest day, followed by the Massif Central on July 14, France’s National Day. The first week of this Tour de France quietly turned the page, right beside the vineyards of the Dordogne Valley.

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